Le régime d’exportation d’armes
du Canada contredit l’image que le Canada a de lui-même en tant que nation
pacifique et progressiste. Maintenant que le Canada est sur le point d’adhérer
au Traité sur le commerce des armes (TCA), le
gouvernement fédéral devrait envisager d’établir des critères plus précis
concernant les risques que du matériel militaire canadien soit utilisé en
violation des lois de la guerre ou des droits de la personne. En outre, il
devrait proposer un cadre qui permettrait d’évaluer ce qui constitue une
violation inacceptable et qui rendrait un acheteur inadmissible aux
exportations (actuelles ou futures). Enfin, il devrait envisager d’aligner la
position canadienne sur celle de ses partenaires et alliés européens en mettant
fin aux exportations vers l’Arabie saoudite.
gouvernements canadiens successifs ont eu tendance à produire des rapports
inadéquats sur les exportations de produits militaires du Canada ainsi que
sur le courtage d’armes au Canada et par des Canadiens dans d’autres pays.
Les ventes de systèmes civils aux utilisateurs finaux militaires ne sont
pas déclarées au Canada, tout comme les ventes aux États-Unis, principal acheteur de
produits militaires fabriqués au Canada. Le TCA oblige le
Canada à modifier ces pratiques et à accroître considérablement la
Le TCA énonce les critères humanitaires
selon lesquels les gouvernements membres exportent des armes classiques,
qu’elles soient légères ou lourdes. C’est le premier et le seul traité
juridiquement contraignant conçu pour réglementer le commerce mondial des
armes, lequel représente plusieurs milliards de dollars. Le Canada sera le dernier État membre de l’OTAN et du G7 à adhérer au
Traité, qui a été adopté par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies
en 2013 et est entré en vigueur en 2014. L’adhésion comporte des modifications
au droit canadien, plus précisément à la Loi sur les licences d’exportation et
d’importation et au Code criminel, et ajoute
de nouveaux critères pour évaluer les demandes de permis d’exportation,
notamment des critères liés à des actes graves de violence fondée sur le sexe
ou à des actes graves de violence contre des femmes et des enfants. Plutôt que
d’interdire des accords d’exportation spécifiques d’aujourd’hui ou de demain,
le TCA ajoute un palier international de responsabilité au processus
décisionnel canadien sur les licences d’exportation, tout en obligeant le
gouvernement fédéral et les exportateurs à maintenir un système de contrôle
national plus transparent et à défendre publiquement leurs évaluations des
Selon les médias et les sondages d’opinion
publique, ce contrat déplaît à de nombreux Canadiens, sinon à la plupart,
pour des raisons à la fois éthiques, juridiques et politiques. Restant l’un des
principaux auteurs de violations des normes internationales relatives aux
droits de la personne, le royaume mène actuellement une guerre au Yémen, où une
coalition militaire dirigée par les Saoudiens cible régulièrement des civils
par des bombardements et des blocus. Cela est non seulement illégal en droit
international, mais aussi une cause directe de ce qui est, selon toute mesure
raisonnable, la pire catastrophe humaine actuelle au monde. De plus, le
gouvernement saoudien s’est engagé dans de multiples différends diplomatiques
avec le Canada et ses alliés. Les relations entre Ottawa et Riyad se sont effondrées
en août 2018 lorsque la ministre des Affaires étrangères, Chrystia Freeland, a
légèrement critiqué l’horrible bilan du royaume en matière de droits de la
personne. Après l’assassinat choquant du journaliste Jamal Khashoggi au
consulat saoudien d’Istanbul plus tard cette année-là, le gouvernement Trudeau
a évoqué la possibilité d’un arrêt des futures expéditions d’armes
renforce la réglementation canadienne actuelle sur les transferts d’armes
et d’équipement militaire. Le gouvernement fédéral est en mesure de renforcer
davantage la réglementation canadienne en augmentant la transparence et en
enregistrant les ventes de tous les produits de fabrication canadienne
utilisés par les armées étrangères.
vertu de la nouvelle loi, le gouvernement fédéral est tenu d’évaluer
toutes les exportations en fonction des critères d’évaluation du TCA, qui
sont très variés, ainsi qu’en fonction d’un critère de risque sérieux.
juger par les déclarations du gouvernement et les sondages d’opinion publique, plusieurs
alliés et partenaires du Canada ne veulent plus armer l’Arabie saoudite.
Le Sénat américain a imputé l’assassinat de Khashoggi au gouvernement
saoudien, et au prince héritier Mohammed bin Salman en particulier, tout
en demandant au gouvernement américain de retirer son aide militaire à la
guerre menée par les Saoudiens au Yémen. Les gouvernements du Danemark, de la Finlande, de la Suède, de l’Autriche et de la Grèce
ont effectivement mis un terme aux futures exportations d’armes vers
l’Arabie saoudite. Le gouvernement allemand a également mis un
terme aux exportations déjà approuvées.
Le gouvernement Trudeau et GDLSC ont tous deux déclaré que
l’annulation de la vente d’armes saoudiennes entraînerait des pénalités
d’un ou plusieurs milliards de dollars que le gouvernement canadien
les conseils des organisations de défense des droits de la personne et
prendre des mesures supplémentaires pour accroître la transparence et
améliorer l’enregistrement des exportations d’armes du Canada; cela
s’appliquerait à toutes les exportations vers les États-Unis, y compris
les sous-systèmes et les composants;
à appliquer des critères stricts d’évaluation du TCA, y compris un critère
de risque sérieux bien conçu, à l’égard des exportations d’armes du
Canada; cela s’appliquerait à toutes les exportations vers les États-Unis,
y compris les sous-systèmes et les composants;
un cadre pour évaluer ce qui constitue une violation inacceptable rendant
un acheteur inadmissible aux exportations, futures ou actuelles;
d’aligner la position du Canada sur celle de ses partenaires et alliés
européens et de mettre fin aux exportations à destination de Riyad.
Publié le mercredi
14 août 2019 dans L'Impact uOttawa. Srdjan Vucetic
We have launched a new
social media endeavor: a podcast! Available here and here with more links soon to
other outlets. Stéfanie von Hlatky and I are co-hosting Battle Rhythm,
one of the first outputs of the Canadian
Defence and Security Network. What is it and why are we doing
The podcast will appear every other Wednesday (we hope--this podcasting stuff
is not easy) on the CGAI
Podcast network. The Canadian
Global Affairs Institute is a partner of the CDSN-RCDS, and a key
contribution to our network is hosting our podcast. We are aiming to keep
each podcast under/around an hour. The first segment will have us discussing
defence and security stuff (Canadian and beyond) that is in news or
otherwise worthy of our attention and falling somewhere near our
expertise. Stef will occasionally report back and comment on debates
going on in Francophone defence and security studies. Sometimes, we will
chat about books we have read.
We will then have a short interview with an Emerging Scholar to
present their research (which is usually further along at the cutting edge than
established profs). The aim will be to provide an outlet to the
next generation, especially those from communities that have been
underrepresented in previous generations.
The third segment will usually be an interview with someone who we have
met along the way--Stef and I interviewed a number of folks who were at the
Kingston Conference on International Security, she interviewed some at the
Annual Workshop of Women In International Security-Canada, and I interviewed
some of those presenting at ERGOMAS and EISS conferences in Europe this summer.
The penultimate segment will be "Steve's Peeves" where
I audibly Spew about an issue that troubles me. I am hoping to lure Stef
into doing some peeving of her own, but she has much greater restraint than I
The last segment will be responding to listener questions, assuming
we get some.
Why are we doing this? First, one of the key missions of the CDSN is to
provide greater visibility to various events in Canada. By conducting
interviews with those attending KCIS and WIIS-C (both run by CDSN partners), we
help to extend the audience for those events both over distance and over time.
An event in Kingston or Toronto will largely get local attendees and those
invited explicitly for the conference. By giving some of these
participants a potentially global (ambitious, aren't we?) platform, our podcast
will extend how far the conference reaches. Because podcasts, once put on
a cloud somewhere, can be downloaded months or years later, it also means that
the stuff presented at a conference can resonate beyond the week of the
conference. The CDSN effort aims to amplify and connect, and this podcast
is a way to do so.
Second, while there are an increasing number of podcasts in Canada on defence
and/or security issues, we think we have a different perspective that might be
of interest. Both of us come at Canadian defence and security with a comparative
perspective as well as the awareness of needing to keep in mind that Canada
never operates alone. Stef and I have both written on alliance
politics. However, our expertise is only overlapping and not identical,
as she has an extensive background studying nuclear policy, US-Canadian
relations, and gender policy in contemporary militaries. My work is more
on the domestic politics of civil-military relations, and my older work is on
intervention and on the international relations of ethnic conflict.
Third, another explicit aim of the CDSN, and one that has been something the
two of us have been doing separately, is to provide outlets for those who have
lacked such outlets. She started the Canadian branch of Women in
International Security-Canada to give female scholars more opportunities to
share their research and to provide more mentoring. One reason why I
started building the CDSN was to do the same for not just women but also people
of color and indigenous voices.
Fourth, despite the
difficulties, podcasting is fun. Doing the podcast gives me more
opportunities to chat with Stef. She is not only smart and dynamic, but
she makes me laugh. And, yes, doing a podcast means one more form of
social media for me to play with. Plus it gives us an excuse to track
down and have extended conversations with interesting folks that we mostly did
not know beforehand. That is one way in which the first episode is not
going to be a model for future podcasts. I interviewed Dan Drezner for
the first episode, and I have known him for nearly two decades. Pretty
much everyone else we have interviewed have been people we met for the podcast
or met quite recently. In sum, I like to talk, I like to talk to Stef,
and I like to talk to people who are excited about their own work.
Hopefully, Battle Rhythm will be fun for our listeners as well.
All I ask is that you have some patience with us, as podcasting is not nearly
as easy as it seems. And let us know via our twitter account @cdsnrcds or via email at email@example.com if you have
suggestions, comments, or questions. Again, we hope to have listener mail
as a regular segment. It has the potential to be the most interesting,
We got the word from SSHRC in late
April that it would be funding the partnership grant the Canadian Defence and
Security Network had sought, but we could not talk about it. We could
operate, but we could not give credit to the funder... until now. The
Minister announced the results,
along with other competitions (hey, co-director Phil, congrats!), so now we can
give thanks to SSHRC for the funds.
And not just the funds for which we are thankful. The partnership grant
process required us to do a great deal of networking and leveraging. That each
partner has to not just specify what it wants out of the partnership, but what
it wants to put into it. Indeed, the process requires partners to give at
least 35% in cash on in kind to match the SSHRC funding. Our partners
went way beyond that.
While the Carleton
publicity gave me heaps of credit, I need to make clear this was very, very
much a team effort. The folks who are now CDSN co-directors helped write
heaps of draft documents (the application has more than 20 pieces), gave
comments on drafts, met in August to discuss the Stage 2 application (it is a
three stage process, with us making it past stage 1 the second time we tried),
and helped bring along more than 30 partners. Our partners had to grapple
with the SSHRC website and with their own legal people to get a Memorandum of
Understanding signed, so I will be forever grateful for them. Our roughly
100 participants also had to do some SSHRC webwork, so I am thankful to
them. I had multiple RAs work on this project with us, doing much of the
tracking and grunge work, so thanks! The folks at Carleton, especially
Kyla Reid, our grants facilitator, who knows this process and has brought
several teams to success over the past few years, will be owed beers for a long
time. Our Dean, Andre Plourde, not only provided support and enthusiasm,
but also served as a mock interviewer for the third stage of the process--a 20
minute interview. Which reminds me that I owe Stéfanie von Hlatky and
Caroline Leprince for kicking butt in the interview. Twas a strange
process, and they came through big-time. Our VP for Research and his
staff were also very helpful.
Now what? Well, since we got the notice in late April:
had a meeting in Ottawa to develop the rules and procedures so that we
started distributing some of the money to the leaders of the five research
hired two great staffers in Jeffrey Rice, our project coordinator, and
Melissa Jennings, our knowledge mobilization coordinator or comms person,
and kept on Alvine Nintai, our excellent research assistant.
have added one new partner and are working to bring along a few others who
have indicated interest.
just transitioned to a new Defence Fellow--a Canadian Forces officer who
becomes part of the CDSN HQ team.
So, yeah, it has been a busy three months. Our next
steps will be to develop the goals that SSHRC wants to measure us by in year
3.5, and to help various partners with their events this fall. It is not
exactly all downhill from here, as years 2-7 will have a variety of activties
that we are not doing this year (annual conference, summer training institute,
book workshop, post-doc competition, etc).
We believed very strongly in this endeavor, that it will provide many
collective goods to help the Canadian Defence and Security community, so we are
most pleased by what we have accomplished thus far, and, finally, we can thank
SSHRC for funding this effort.
a globe-spanning economic and security project—with a cost of over a trillion
dollars and whose members encompass 46 percent of the global economy—designed
to advance the interests and influence of the lead state, even as it binds the
smaller ones into an asymmetric interdependence. Recipients get large economic
rewards for participating, but they will find it even more expensive to extract
themselves from the network in the long run.
one day, China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which by the most generous
definition of membership encompasses 40 percent of the world economy in its
sprawling infrastructure initiatives, will live up to this description. But the
United States’ Joint Strike Fighter program, peddling the F-35 fighter jet,
already does, something the recent brinkmanship between
Turkey and the United States makes clearer than ever.
Friday, Ankara received the first parts of a Russian S-400 missile defense
system, which Washington says is incompatible with Turkey’s participation in
the F-35 consortium. The Department of Defense has already stopped
training Turkish pilots on the aircraft at Luke Air Force Base in
Arizona, and Congress is threatening to kick Turkey out of the program
entirely. In the worst-case scenario for Turkey, the United States can
sanctions on the country under the Countering America’s Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act, ranging from denying visas to restrictions on almost any
Turkish arms exports to banning access to U.S. financial institutions.
F-35, a highly capable fifth generation aircraft, has been rightly criticized
for being over budget, long delayed, and burdened with design flaws. Yet the
“jet that ate the Pentagon,” to use one critic’s biting
phrase, has yet to lose out to any other fighter in any formal procurement
competition. And whereas many countries can build a port, albeit not as cheaply
as China, building weapons is different. No other country has yet built a
high-end fighter like the F-35 at any price.
fighters require thousands of subcomponents drawn from many different
technologies and involving a dizzying supply chain. The upfront development
costs of the F-35 are staggering and can only be offset by purchasing large
quantities. And once a country has several F-35s in its fleet, switching
to a (less advanced) competitor is unappealing. Meanwhile, laggard
states—facing the prospect of potential rivals buying larger, more advanced
jets—will be pressured to join the winning program, leading to market
has been criticized for using Belt and Road-related debt coercively, for
example by taking
overa Sri Lankan port lease for 99 years after the country failed to
repay a loan. And China’s Defense Minister recently
confirmed that the initiative has a military component. But the F-35
program goes far further. It makes a state’s very security reliant on the
United States for decades—and Washington uses that leverage. In 2005, it suspended Israel’s
access to the program in retaliation for Israel selling drone parts to China.
Israel quickly stopped those sales.
is even more dependent on the F-35 network, because its own aviation industry
supplies a number of F-35 components. It would face major losses if the United
States cut Turkey off for good. Whereas the Pentagon estimates that finding
alternate domestic suppliers to replace Turkey will cause at most a few months’
delay, Turkish production lines will be unable to so easily adapt, putting at
risk the $12 billion in component parts business Turkey expected. That figure
may be a rounding error for the trillion-dollar F-35 program, but it is
equivalent to eight years’ worth of all Turkish aerospace exports. Erdogan will
thus pay a high
cost if he crosses the United States and persists in his purchase of
the United States stopped sending F-35s to Turkey in April, Belgium ordered 34
planes, Singapore took steps to order 40 to 60, and Japan increased an existing
order by 105, more than making up for Turkey’s 100. Meanwhile, although Italy’s
governing Five Star Movement ran on a platform of canceling the program, it has
since backed down. As Five Star’s junior defense minister reported to
parliament in December 2018, “It is obvious we cannot deprive our Air Force of
a great air capability that puts us ahead of many other countries.”
to the fighter network, Belt and Road’s optimistic projections cover a larger
landmass and more
countries, and—crucially—the initiative brands itself as a generator of
wealth and peaceful co-existence on a global scale. But Joint Strike Fighter
membership provides its own benefits in terms of prestige, access to technology
and subcontracts, and close security ties with the United States. Sovereign
states will balance these benefits against the potential for dependency—and
indeed which country they will have to depend upon. Perhaps Belt and Road wins
out in the future, but the current reality favors the U.S. version.
Today, May 24th, the Canadian Defence and Security Network (Réseau Canadian Sur La Défense and La Sécurité) kicks off!
This is what our network looks like now!
We have built an excellent team
of scholars and defence scientists to lead the effort and already have a
terrific staff to do much of the heavy lifting and day-to-day management. In
addition to that, we have so many partners who strengthened our application through
the commitments they have made. I am so very grateful for the work done thus far and
the work to be done by our leadership team (David Bercuson, JC Boucher, Andrea
Charron, Irina Goldenberg, Phil Lagassé, Anessa Kimball, Alex Moens, Alan
Okros, Stéphane Roussel, Stéfanie Von Hlatky, and Srdjan Vucetic), the folks at
CDSN HQ (Jeffrey Rice, Melissa Jennings, Alvine Nintai), the people at NPSIA,
our dean, Kyla Reid--grants facilitator extraordinaire, other folks at Carleton
including our VP for Research, and our partners and participants.
Of course, as you are reading this, you are asking yourself: what is the
Canadian Defence and Security Network and what is it supposed to
It is a partnership involving academics at both civilian and
military universities, units within the Canadian Armed Forces, elements of the
Department of National Defence, think tanks, advocacy organizations, a survey
firm, and more. We have a set of common objectives:
create a coherent, world-class research network.
advance our understanding of defence and security issues.
tailor research initiatives to provided evidence-based knowledge to inform
improve the transfer of knowledge and data across various divides.
improve the defence and security literacy of Canadians (and beyond).
build the next generation of experts with an emphasis on equity, diversity
How will we reach those objectives? The CDSN will focus on
five themes to coordinate research efforts--personnel, procurement, operations,
civil-military relations, and security--while also providing resources via our headquarters to assist its members
and its partners to collaborate and amplify their work.
To provide an example, one can imagine an event organized by
scholars in Kingston or Calgary. The CDSN Headquarters (based at CSIDS at NPSIA) will help provide
contacts to reach out beyond the networks of the organizers, it will help
publicize the event through the CDSN's social media efforts (yes, we have some
experience in that stuff), and then after the event, provide a repository for
the data generated, the papers and policy briefs that are produced and spread
the findings via our website and our podcast.
For our first year, we will be focusing mostly on developing our
infrastructure and figuring out how to help the various members of the CDSN
community. In years 2-7, we will have thematic workshops on our five areas
of research; book workshops for junior scholars; post-docs; surveys of the
Canadian public; network analyses; summer training institutes for scholars,
military officers and policy officers; an annual conference; defence
fellowships for military officers; and capital capstone events that will bring
the best young presenters from events across Canada to Ottawa to present to defence
Our twitter account is: https://twitter.com/CdsnRcds.
The website will be announced in the near future, and we will certainly have
facebook, instragram and other social media accounts that we will be announcing
over the next few months. Our logos are a work in progress, but this is
what we have thus far:
you are interested in joining our efforts or have questions, shoot us an email at CDSN-RCDS@carleton.ca.